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1373 
Agglomerama 
Lee Anne Fennell* 
The world’s population is rapidly becoming urbanized and in a 
matter of decades will be overwhelmingly so.1 Already, over eighty 
percent of the U.S. population dwells in urban areas.2 The forces that 
explain these trends, which can be placed under the general rubric of 
agglomeration economies,3 present a newly pressing challenge for 
students of commons dilemmas. How can urban space, and the 
property rights that structure it, be organized in ways that will foster 
and capture the positive externalities produced by proximity among 
people and land uses while controlling the negative spillovers 
produced by that same proximity? 
The problem is a tricky one. Because the raw ingredients of 
collaboration and interaction—people, businesses, products, services, 
 
* Max Pam Professor of Law and Ronald H. Coase Research Scholar, University of Chicago 
Law School. I thank Marcilynn Burke, Daria Roithmayr, Carol Rose, David Schleicher, Lior 
Strahilevitz, Barton Thompson, Jr., and the participants in the 2014 BYU Law Review 
Symposium on the Global Commons for helpful comments and questions. I am also grateful 
for financial support from the Stuart C. and JoAnn Nathan and Harold J. Green Faculty Funds 
and the Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation. 
 1. See U.N. DEP’T OF ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS, POPULATION DIV., WORLD 
URBANIZATION PROSPECTS, THE 2014 REVISION, HIGHLIGHTS, at 1, U.N. Doc. 
ST/ESA/SER.A/352 (2014), available at 
http://esa.un.org/unpd/wup/Highlights/WUP2014-Highlights.pdf (reporting that “54 per 
cent of the world’s population resid[ed] in urban areas in 2014” and that “by 2050, 66 per 
cent of the world’s population is projected to be urban”); Michael Batty, Commentary, When 
All the World’s a City, 43 ENV’T & PLAN. A 765, 767–78 (2011) (predicting that if current 
trends continue, “the entire world will be urbanised by 2092”). 
 2. Growth in Urban Population Outpaces Rest of Nation, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Mar. 
26, 2012), http://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/2010_census/cb12-
50.html (reporting, based on data from the 2010 Census, that “[u]rban areas—defined as 
densely developed residential, commercial and other nonresidential areas—now account for 
80.7% of the U.S. population, up from 79.0% in 2000”). In 1790, the figure was 5.1%, 
although there have been some intervening changes in the Census Bureau’s definition of 
“urban.” See Population: 1790 to 1990: United States, Urban and Rural, U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/population/censusdata/table-4.pdf (last visited Sept. 9, 
2014); see also History: Urban and Rural Areas, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
http://www.census.gov/history/www/programs/geography/urban_and_rural_areas.html 
(last visited Sept. 9, 2014) (detailing definitional changes). 
 3. See infra Part I.A.1. 
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venues—take up space and time, congestion vies with agglomeration 
benefits within cities.4 It is not simply a case of “the more the 
merrier”;5 each additional participant can add value only by burning 
up scarce inputs, including space. Brilliant thoughts that might be 
added together without apparent limit suddenly run into hard 
constraints when they must be delivered in human form, given all 
that is necessary to house and propel and sustain human beings as 
they interact. Likewise, the complementarities offered by 
agglomerations of shops, entertainment establishments, and 
restaurants are limited by the physical space that each consumes—
space that can be managed and shrunk with clever layout and 
transportation solutions,6 but that nonetheless pushes back hard 
against the advantages of adding more energy and variety to a 
district.7 Meanwhile, heterogeneous households and businesses 
asymmetrically generate and absorb the negative and positive 
externalities that are interwoven through urban life.8 
Urban interaction space can be conceptualized as a type of 
commons.9 It presents the threat of overcrowding or overharvesting, 
 
 4. The negative aspects of agglomeration are sometimes referred to in the literature as 
“agglomeration diseconomies,” although I will primarily use the word “congestion” very 
broadly to refer to these negative effects. See infra Part I.A.2; see also David Schleicher, The 
City as a Law and Economic Subject, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1507, 1528–29 (2010) (noting the 
“catch-all” way in which the term “congestion” is used and suggesting the term 
“negative agglomerations”). 
 5. See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and 
Inherently Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 768 (1986) (explaining that increasing 
returns to scale can produce what amounts to “the reverse of the ‘tragedy of the commons’: it 
is a ‘comedy of the commons,’ as is so felicitously expressed in the phrase, ‘the more 
the merrier’”). 
 6. See, e.g., Gideon Parchomovsky & Peter Siegelman, Cities, Property, and Positive 
Externalities, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 211, 251–52 (2012) (discussing “vertical malls” like 
Water Tower Place in Chicago). 
 7. I will use the term “energy” throughout the piece in a nontechnical way to refer to 
the vibrancy or vitality of an area, which produces its agglomeration benefits. Earlier work has 
used similar terms to get at this idea. See, e.g., Casey Dougal et al., Urban Vibrancy and 
Corporate Growth, 70 J. Fin. 163, 165 (2015) (using the term “vibrancy” to capture “the 
endogenous interactions of the people living in the city . . . that influence knowledge diffusion 
between a city’s workers, technology spillovers between neighboring firms, or consumption 
externalities between city’s residents”). 
 8. See infra Part II (discussing heterogeneity). 
 9. That urban areas embody and embed common-pool resources is well recognized. 
For example, some recent work has focused on how to manage access to congestible or 
degradable resources such as urban public parks or shared spatial elements. See, e.g., Sheila R. 
Foster, Collective Action and the Urban Commons, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 57 (2011); 
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but it also poses the risk of undercultivation if it fails to attract parties 
who are well suited to generate agglomeration benefits.10 The 
method for rationing access to prime urban space should, therefore, 
select not only for the value that users place on locating in particular 
spots, but also for those users’ agglomeration-friendly and 
congestion-mitigating traits. What is being rationed is not just access 
to the consumption opportunities that particular urban districts 
offer, but also access to a (rivalrous) production platform for 
generating the very agglomeration economies that make those 
consumption opportunities so valuable. The challenge is to assemble 
participants together whose joint consumption and production 
activities will maximize social value. 
Cities thus embed a particularly interesting type of collective 
action problem, which I will refer to here as a “participant assembly 
problem.” Economists have studied many similarly structured 
problems. Some notable examples include concert and event ticket 
pricing that is designed to attract enthusiastic audiences,11 shopping 
mall leasing practices that account for asymmetric spillovers between 
anchor and smaller stores,12 local government services like schooling 
and safety for which residents represent an important input,13 and 
 
Nicole Stelle Garnett, Managing the Urban Commons, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1995 (2012); see 
also Benjamin Davy, Polyrational Property: Rules for the Many Uses of Land, 8 INT’L J. 
COMMONS 472, 475 (2014) (addressing the “spatial commons,” defined as “the shared land 
uses typical of cities and other human settlements”); Bradley C. Karkkainen, Zoning: A Reply to 
the Critics, 10 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 45, 68–69 (1994) (discussing the “neighborhood 
commons”). Other scholars have turned a spotlight on infrastructure elements like roads and 
mass transit that are interlaced through private holdings but that themselves elude private 
ownership. See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, Commons and Growth: The Essential Role of Open 
Commons in Market Economies, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1499 (2013) (reviewing BRETT 
FRISCHMANN, INFRASTRUCTURE: THE SOCIAL VALUE OF SHARED RESOURCES (2012)). My 
discussion focuses primarily on distortions in location choices, a topic distinct from these other 
inquiries, but one which carries implications for them (and vice versa). 
 10. See Rose, supra note 5, at 769 (noting that in contexts like festivals, “participants 
need encouragement to join these activities, where their participation produces beneficial 
‘externalities’ for other participants”). 
 11. See infra note 127 and accompanying text. 
 12. These leasing practices have been expressly invoked as a potential model for 
addressing urban spillovers. See Parchomovsky & Siegelman, supra note 6; B. Peter Pashigian 
& Eric D. Gould, Internalizing Externalities: The Pricing of Space in Shopping Malls, 41 J.L. & 
ECON. 115, 140–41 (1998). 
 13. See, e.g., Robert M. Schwab & Wallace E. Oates, Community Composition and the 
Provision of Local Public Goods: A Normative Analysis, 44 J. PUB. ECON. 217 (1991); Wallace 
E. Oates, The Use of Local Zoning Ordinances to Regulate Population Flows and the Quality of 
Local Services, in ESSAYS IN LABOR MARKET ANALYSIS 201 (Orley C. Ashenfelter & Wallace E. 
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differential pricing in higher education to assemble a desired mix of 
students.14 In these cases and more, the characteristics of users or 
customers are inputs into the quality of a good,15 complicating the 
problem of rationing access through ordinary market (or market-
mimicking) measures. Despite some worthy recent attempts to 
grapple with the issue of optimizing agglomeration spillovers in 
cities,16 the legal literature lacks a solid account of the participant 
assembly problems that emerge within urban areas and how they 
might be resolved. In this essay, I make a start at exploring 
that issue.17 
The analysis proceeds in three Parts. Part I specifies the nature of 
the commons problem that agglomeration and its evil twin, 
congestion, together present within urban areas. Part II focuses on 
the significance of heterogeneity among economic actors and recasts 
the challenge as one of participant assembly. Part III surveys a set of 
strategies that have been pursued or might be pursued to grapple 
with these problems. The emerging significance of urban 
agglomeration requires the law to think flexibly and creatively about 
the problem of co-location in its assignment and refinement of 
property rights. 
I. URBAN INTERACTION SPACE AS A COMMONS 
A city is not a single common-pool resource, but rather 
comprises multiple overlapping resources that interact with private 
holdings and that residents, visitors, firms, commuters, tourists, and 
others access, exploit, produce, and regenerate in varying 
 
Oates eds., 1977). 
 14. See, e.g., Michael Rothschild & Lawrence J. White, The Analytics of the Pricing of 
Higher Education and Other Services in Which the Customers Are Inputs, 103 J. POL. ECON. 
573 (1995). 
 15. See, e.g., id. 
 16. See, e.g., Daniel B. Rodriguez & David Schleicher, The Location Market, 19 GEO. 
MASON L. REV. 637 (2012). 
  17. Agglomeration benefits come in many forms and exist at a variety of scales, from 
block-level to regional. See, e.g., id. at 638; Pierre-Phillippe Combes & Laurent Gobillon, The 
Empirics of Agglomeration Economies, in 5 HANDBOOK OF REGIONAL AND URBAN 
ECONOMICS 247, 294–95 (Gilles Duranton et al. eds., 2015); see also infra Part I.A.1. I focus 
primarily here on relatively small-scale urban settings—prime urban districts—where space is 
constrained even if the metropolitan area or the city itself can expand outward. Accordingly, 
my analysis does not address factors that bear on the overall growth paths of cities, such as 
mountains or bodies of water that present natural barriers to expansion, although these 
features can influence the prevalence of good substitutes for a given urban district. 
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combinations. This Part focuses on one set of decisions that 
profoundly influences the dynamics of these multiple commons: the 
location choices of firms and households.18 When economic actors—
firms and households—occupy private property in urban areas, the 
locations they choose serve as platforms for accessing (and 
controlling access to) a composite urban resource that I will term 
“interaction space.” The amount of value that urban interaction 
space can generate depends on who can access it, both as consumers 
of the space and as contributors to its quality—whether for good or 
ill. Location choices determine access to interaction space but, due 
to externalized costs and benefits, do not fully price in the effects of 
that access. 
Section A examines the externalized costs and benefits that flow 
from locating within urban areas—both positive agglomeration 
benefits and negative congestion costs. Section B explores the 
dilemmas these externalities can produce. 
A. Agglomeration and Congestion 
The densities and interdependencies that characterize urban life 
yield both positive and negative externalities. The former are often 
associated with the benefits of agglomeration (agglomeration 
economies), while the latter are typically associated with the idea of 
congestion (agglomeration diseconomies). The tradeoffs between 
these two types of impacts have been the subject of economic 
treatments of city formation and growth.19 Here, I focus on how 
these two types of externalities might distort the location choices of 
firms and households. 
 
 18. By location choices, I mean decisions to possess and occupy real property in a fixed 
location on an ongoing (more than short-term) basis, typically through ownership of a 
leasehold or fee interest. Shorter-term occupancy of spaces by hotel guests, homeless people, 
hospital patients, and so on also represent interesting location choices that bear on the overall 
urban fabric, but these will be addressed here only indirectly through the decisions made by 
the owners and operators of the properties that they inhabit. 
 19. See, e.g., Luís M.A. Bettencourt, The Origins of Scaling in Cities, 340 SCIENCE, 
June 21, 2013, at 1438; Jeffrey C. Brinkman, Congestion, Agglomeration, and the 
Structure of Cities (Fed. Reserve Bank of Phila., Working Paper No. 13-25, 2013), 
available at http://philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/publications/working-
papers/2013/wp13-25.pdf. 
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1. Agglomeration 
The benefits of agglomeration—the clustering together of firms 
and households—have long been recognized,20 but legal scholarship 
has recently begun to engage agglomeration economics in a more 
direct and sustained way.21 Various enumerations of the benefits 
flowing from clustering have appeared in the literature, many of 
which use the work of Alfred Marshall as a starting point22 and 
emphasize such factors as knowledge spillovers among firms, labor-
market matching, and supply linkages.23 One influential taxonomy 
uses the broad categories of “sharing, matching, and learning 
mechanisms.”24 Parties in close proximity with each other are able to 
share indivisible resources (as well as risk) and mutually benefit from 
shared access to urban variety and diversity.25 Proximity also enables 
actors to match up with each other in labor and other markets26 and 
 
 20. The legal literature has sometimes referred to these benefits by other names or in 
somewhat different ways than has the economics literature. For example, Carol Rose examined 
the benefits of certain forms of widespread collective participation (such as in markets and 
dances) through the lens of the commons. Rose, supra note 5. Her focus on increasing returns 
to scale and the positive externalities of participation is very much in line with the notion of 
agglomeration benefits, though she does not use that term. See id. at 766–71; see also 
Schleicher, supra note 4, at 1510 & n.14 (discussing legal literature addressing agglomeration 
and related ideas); Benkler, supra note 9, at 1511–18 (discussing Rose’s contributions and 
their connections to later work on the public domain and infrastructure commons). 
 21. See, e.g., Schleicher, supra note 4, at 1510 & n.14; see generally id.; Parchomovsky & 
Siegelman, supra note 6; Rodriguez & Schleicher, supra note 16. 
 22. ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS IV.X.7–13 §3 (8th ed. 1920), 
available at http://www.econlib.org/library/Marshall/marP.html. 
 23. See Gilles Duranton & Diego Puga, Micro-Foundations of Urban Agglomeration 
Economies, in 4 HANDBOOK OF REGIONAL AND URBAN ECONOMICS 2063, 2066 (2004); see 
also J. Vernon Henderson, Urban Scale Economies, in HANDBOOK OF URBAN STUDIES 243, 
243–48 (Ronan Paddison ed., 2001) (identifying Marshall’s work with the categories of 
“[i]nformation spillovers,” “[l]abour market externalities,” and “[u]rban diversity and Adam 
Smith specialization”); Schleicher, supra note 4, at 1516 (identifying Marshall’s work with 
“three effects”: “reduced transportation costs for goods,” “insurance and specialization gains 
from large labor and consumption markets,” and “information spillovers”). 
 24.  Duranton & Puga, supra note 23, at 2066 (emphasis omitted); see Combes & 
Gobillon, supra note 17, at 249 (citing Duranton and Puga’s schema as “the currently most 
used typology”). 
 25.  See Duranton & Puga, supra note 23, at 2067–86 (analyzing sharing mechanisms). 
 26.  See id. at 2086–98 (analyzing matching mechanisms). Although studies of 
agglomeration economies often focus on labor market matching, urban areas also facilitate the 
matching of people into relationships, social organizations, and so on. See, e.g., Schleicher, 
supra note 4, at 1521–23. The specialization and diversity in an urban area, including its 
shopping and entertainment districts, also match customers more quickly and precisely with 
the goods and services they prefer. See id. at 1522. 
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learn from each other.27 Perhaps the most intuitive agglomeration 
benefit is the reduction in transportation costs produced by 
proximity. Indeed, Edward Glaeser boils down the benefits of 
agglomeration to the single idea of reducing transportation costs—
for “goods, people and ideas.”28 
The most economically significant manifestations of these 
benefits can shift over time as technology changes.29 But whether the 
advantages take the form of deep labor markets, long-tailed retail 
diversification, convenient shopping districts, exciting nightlife, 
opportunities for relationship matching, or specialized knowledge 
basins, real economic value is produced by the co-location of people 
and firms within urban areas. The magnitude and nature of these 
gains will be sensitive to the relative spatial placement of households, 
firms, and various land uses within the urban envelope. Not all 
landowners are capable of producing the level of agglomeration 
benefits that is optimal for a given location. Hence, it is not only 
necessary for landowners to “do the right thing” in a given space, 
but also for them to “occupy the right spaces”—and stay away from 
spaces where their contributions will be suboptimal.30 
 
  27. See Duranton & Puga, supra note 23, at 2098–109 (analyzing 
learning mechanisms). 
 28. EDWARD L. GLAESER, CITIES, AGGLOMERATION, AND SPATIAL EQUILIBRIUM 
6–8, 117 (2008). 
 29. For example, some scholars have suggested that cities have become less important as 
sites of production as the spatial constraints on production have loosened and that their 
importance now turns on their role as sites of consumption. See, e.g., Edward L. Glaeser, Jed 
Kolko & Albert Saiz, Consumers and Cities, in THE CITY AS AN ENTERTAINMENT MACHINE 
135 (Terry Nichols Clark ed., 2011). On this account, the ability for cities to conveniently 
provide a wide array of niche goods and (especially) nonportable services and experiences 
becomes relatively more important than the ability of the city to economize on trips to and 
from the workplace. See id. at 136 (observing that “restaurants, theaters, and an attractive mix 
of social partners are hard to transport and are therefore local goods”); see also MARSHALL, 
supra note 22, at IV.X.14 § 4 (observing that reductions in transportation costs enable firms to 
buy distant goods but also “tend[] to bring skilled artisans to ply their crafts near to the 
consumers who will purchase their wares”); Parchomovsky & Siegelman, supra note 6, at 242 
(focusing on the transportation cost savings that become available when shoppers are able to 
bundle their shopping trips for multiple items). 
 30. It is well recognized that land use conflicts are sometimes best solved by one party—
and not necessarily the one engaging in the more intensive use—staying away. See, e.g., Ind. 
Harbor Belt R.R. Co. v Am. Cyanamid Co., 916 F.2d 1174, 1181 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J.) 
(“Brutal though it may seem to say it, the inappropriate use to which land is being put in the 
Blue Island yard and neighborhood may be, not the transportation of hazardous chemicals, but 
residential living. The analogy is to building your home between the runways at O’Hare.”). It 
can also be inefficient for parties to co-locate even when their land uses are perfectly 
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2. Congestion 
Congestion is the flip side of agglomeration. Its existence 
illuminates the type of good that agglomeration benefits really are. 
As a first cut, we might say that congestion keeps agglomeration 
from being a pure public good—a resource that is both 
nonexcludable and nonrival.31 Rather, congestion makes 
agglomeration benefits rivalrous or “subtractable,” even as exclusion 
from those benefits remains difficult—in other words, a common-
pool resource.32 Like Hardin’s prototypical pasture, urban space is 
“open to all” and subject to overgrazing.33 But that is not the full 
story. Agglomeration benefits are not depleted by individuals literally 
consuming or degrading them in the manner of a cow eating and 
trampling grass. Rather, the depletion occurs in two other ways. 
The first involves people jostling for a good position in the urban 
interaction space. To receive agglomeration benefits, one must 
occupy a location that affords access to them. This interaction space 
is degraded when too many people try to occupy it at once, even if 
the agglomeration benefits themselves are unaffected.34 Think of a 
free open-air concert. If too many people crowd near the stage, the 
listening and viewing zone may become unpleasantly crowded. The 
music itself is unaffected, but getting into a position to consume this 
nonrival good requires occupying physical space, which is rival. 
Agglomeration benefits, then, might be viewed as nonrival goods 
that are strictly complementary to the rival common-pool resource of 
well-positioned space. 
Second, congestion elicits responses that can impede the 
production of agglomeration benefits. Before purely physical or 
engineering capacity constraints are reached, the negative effects of 
 
compatible, if the co-location forecloses a different co-location that would yield 
greater benefits. 
 31. See, e.g., RICHARD CORNES & TODD SANDLER, THE THEORY OF EXTERNALITIES, 
PUBLIC GOODS, AND CLUB GOODS 6–7 (1986). 
 32. See, e.g., ELINOR OSTROM, UNDERSTANDING INSTITUTIONAL DIVERSITY 23–24 
& fig.1.3 (2005). 
 33. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1244 (1968). 
 34. In the urban context, an interaction space represents a congestible resource-
appropriation environment within which nonrival agglomeration benefits can be enjoyed. Cf. 
Lee Anne Fennell, Common Interest Tragedies, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 907, 922–24 (2004) 
(noting that although a “fixed-pot” resource is not diminished by commoners competing over 
it, there can still be losses in the linked “resource-appropriation environment”). 
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congestion will typically prompt collective action that rations access 
to the interaction space, turning it into at least a partially excludable 
resource.35 But unless the method of rationing access is well 
calibrated to allow in the right number and type of participants, 
agglomeration economies may suffer. For example, a predominance 
of large-lot zoning can limit the number of people who can enter a 
municipality for purposes of consuming its goods and services, but it 
also limits the number of people who will be on hand to add to the 
life of the community. 
Heterogeneity among potential participants creates additional 
difficulties. When space is tightly limited, every inclusion implies an 
exclusion—one that will impact both the consumption and 
production sides of the urban agglomeration equation. Ideally, prime 
urban space for generating agglomeration benefits would be 
matched to its most valuable use, taking into account the congestion 
impacts inflicted and suffered by that use. The fact that not all of the 
effects of locational choices are internalized to the chooser, however, 
presents an interesting collective action problem. 
B. Locating Dilemmas 
To understand the nature of the dilemma produced by location 
decisions, we can start by examining where and how private payoffs 
and social payoffs diverge. 
1. Mixed ownership and incentive misalignments 
Tragedies of the commons come in two basic flavors: overuse 
(e.g., overgrazing a pasture) and underinvestment (e.g., shirking on 
a communal farm).36 Both problems arise from a misalignment 
between privately owned elements (cows and labor) and commonly 
 
 35. If the excludability is complete enough, the agglomeration benefits may resemble a 
club good. For description and analysis of club goods, see James M. Buchanan, An Economic 
Theory of Clubs, 32 ECONOMICA 125 (1965). See also OSTROM, supra note 32, at 23–24 
fig.1.3 (using the term “toll goods” for resources combining relatively easy exclusion with 
low subtractability). 
 36. Nothing turns on this distinction, however, and it is often possible to characterize a 
given situation in both ways. See Fennell, supra note 34, at 917 (observing that a dirty carpet 
in the common room of a house could be characterized either as stemming from overuse of 
the carpet while wearing muddy shoes or underinvestment in shoe-cleaning or carpet-
cleaning efforts). 
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owned elements (pastures and crops).37 People make decisions that 
simultaneously affect both the commonly owned and individually 
owned elements, but because they experience all of the payoffs 
associated with the private holdings and only a fraction of the payoffs 
of the common holdings, these decisions may be skewed. The 
resulting incentive misalignment can be readily modeled as a two-
person Prisoner’s Dilemma in which each party has an incentive to 
defect (add too many cattle, for example), regardless of what the 
other person does.38 This tragic result is far from inevitable for a 
number of reasons that have been well rehearsed in the literature.39 
Nonetheless, the standard fable provides a conceptual starting point 
for thinking about how private and social payoffs pull apart. 
The city analog to placing an additional cow on the commons is 
the decision to locate one’s firm or household, along with the 
privately owned structure that contains it, in a particular position 
within an urban area.40 Such structures and their operations, like 
grazing cattle, draw sustenance from, and visit impacts upon, the 
surrounding community. Does the city then become “overgrazed”? 
Not necessarily. As Carol Rose explained in The Comedy of the 
Commons, there are aspects of city life—marketplaces, 
communication, celebration—that gain energy and value from an 
abundance of participants.41 Instead of resembling cattle that only 
degrade the commons with their trampling and grazing, economic 
actors who locate themselves within a city operate more like an 
especially talented variety of cattle who, by virtue of their proximity 
 
 37. See, e.g., id. at 916; Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, The Property Right 
Paradigm, 33 J. ECON. HIST. 16, 22–23 (1973) (noting problematic potential of “incongruity 
between ownership opportunities”); Lee Anne Fennell, Commons, Anticommons, 
Semicommons, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY LAW 35, 37–38 
& n.16 (Kenneth Ayotte & Henry E. Smith eds., 2011) (discussing tragedy as a function of an 
abutment between private and common ownership elements and citing related literature). 
 38. See, e.g., ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF 
INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 3–5 (1990). 
 39. See id. at 58–102 (describing self-governed common-pool resources that have 
endured for long periods of time); see also Fennell, supra note 37, at 35–36 
(discussing literature). 
 40. It might seem that one is not making any decision at all about the placement of the 
structure one occupies if one moves into an existing building. However, by occupying the 
structure for one’s intended purpose, it is as if one is effectively continuing to locate the 
structure there over time insofar as one’s own occupancy stands as an impediment to the 
repurposing, demolition, or reconfiguration of the structure in question. 
 41. Rose, supra note 5; see also supra Part I.A.1 (discussing agglomeration benefits). 
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to each other, can cause manna to rain down from heaven for 
everyone—even as they also trample and graze. 
Thus, some of the returns from urban locational decisions are 
privately captured by the locating actors and some are diffused 
through the community through parallels to manna (agglomeration 
benefits) and trampling (congestion costs).42 The relationship among 
these payoff streams bears on firm and household decisions about 
where to locate—and determines whether and how those decisions 
will be distorted. 
2. Privately captured returns: Of buckets and spoons 
First, consider a firm’s or household’s privately captured returns. 
These returns can stem either from the owner’s activities on her 
property or from her choice of location, which exposes her to 
negative and positive spillovers from outside her property. I have 
previously characterized property as a “leaky bucket of gambles” that 
aims, albeit imperfectly, to collect inputs made by the owner and 
deliver back to her the associated outcomes.43 In an agrarian context, 
the relationship is captured by the idea of reaping what one sows, 
where enforceable property boundaries do a reasonable job of 
containing both inputs and outcomes. As we move to metropolitan 
settings, however, an increasingly large proportion of the value 
associated with property has nothing to do with what the owner is 
doing on or with the property; rather, it depends on where the 
property is located relative to other users and uses (as mediated by 
land use controls and augmented by governmental provision of 
infrastructure and public goods). Thus, the outcomes of the gambles 
any given owner takes with respect to her property are increasingly in 
the hands of other parties. 44 
Private property continues to serve as a locus for making and 
collecting on investments that are made on-site, but many of the 
 
 42. Although I use the term “congestion costs” as shorthand, not all costs associated 
with locational choices take the form of physical crowdedness. Pockets of low-density space 
that must be traversed in order for parties to interact and secure agglomeration benefits also 
serve to “congest” the relevant urban landscape, even though they may make the area feel 
less rather than more crowded. 
 43. Lee Anne Fennell, Property and Half-Torts, 116 YALE L.J. 1400, 1405, 1442–
43 (2007). 
 44. By the same token, her activities as an owner are likely to have increasingly 
significant cross-boundary impacts on those around her, for better or worse. 
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privately captured payoffs it generates stem from its location rather 
than from behavior on the part of the owner. Real property, by 
virtue of the spatial position it occupies relative to other uses and 
users, serves as a kind of spoon for collecting the positive benefits of 
agglomeration. The value of what is scooped up depends not just on 
who is co-located nearby, but also on how the owner’s uses interact 
with those co-located uses. However, just as only so many spoons 
can be inserted into a communal bowl of ice cream before the 
dessert-eating experience starts to degrade,45 the agglomeration-
scooping capacity of property is rival and subject to congestion. Each 
economic actor that locates in a given interaction space depletes the 
physical area available to others who might similarly wish to enjoy 
agglomeration benefits. 
Of course, as the reference to congestion suggests, part of what 
the property scoops up comprises negative rather than positive effects 
of proximity to other uses and users. Where these negative elements 
dominate, the property’s location may be more like a sponge that 
passively picks up externalities than a spoon that actively seeks to 
capture them. Every economic actor would prefer that others absorb 
the negative impacts of neighboring uses but wishes to be located in 
such a manner as to benefit from the positive impacts. 
3. Dispersed impacts: Sloshes and sparks 
Consider next the impacts that are not captured by a given owner, 
but that are instead diffused to others in the area, becoming part of 
the locational payoffs that nearby others enjoy (or suffer). Some of 
these dispersed impacts are literal spillovers from specific behaviors 
that owners engage in on their properties. A factory that makes 
widgets or chocolate will have impacts, negative or positive, on 
multiple neighbors by virtue of dust or odors put into the air that flow 
over the property lines. These are “sloshes” (even if microscopic or 
aesthetic) from the owner’s bucket of gambles. Spillovers of this 
nature are discouraged by the law; one can be made to pay for harms 
affecting one’s neighbors, but one cannot generally collect payment 
for benefits conferred on them.46 This asymmetry exists for good 
 
 45. See Carol M. Rose, Rethinking Environmental Controls: Management Strategies for 
Common Resources, 1991 DUKE L.J. 1, 6 (using an ice cream cone as an example of an 
individual resource, whereas “a milkshake might allow two consumers, if they are friendly”). 
 46. See, e.g., Ariel Porat, Private Production of Public Goods: Liability for Unrequested 
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reason: it creates incentives for economic actors to keep the impacts of 
their operations within their own boundaries and to avoid substituting 
forced transactions for consensual ones.47 
Other impacts flow cumulatively or synergistically from the 
combined interactions of businesses, enterprises, and households. 
For example, each proximate commercial shop contributes to a 
“shopping district” and each art gallery contributes to the “gallery 
district” simply by virtue of its existence and possession of certain 
functional and qualitative attributes. Similarly, a “tech corridor” or 
“eclectic neighborhood” depends in significant part on the 
cumulative characteristics of the enterprises and residents, 
respectively. Impacts in this category are not unintended sloshes 
from a discrete on-site enterprise but rather are “sparks” that can 
come together to produce local public goods (or bads), depending 
on who and what else is in the vicinity. If there is nothing nearby to 
“catch fire,” the impact is never experienced.48 Where the effects are 
positive, there is a social interest in promoting the mix of conditions 
and participants that foster them. 
As with actual sparks that can contribute to destructive fires or 
productive combustion, mixing activity within an interaction space 
can produce negative as well as positive synergies. Under the general 
rubric of congestion we can place a variety of negatives, from crime 
and juvenile delinquency, to low-level increases in incivility and 
jostling, to issues like pollution and traffic snarls. While some of 
these effects may be easy to connect to particular land uses (and 
 
Benefits, 108 MICH. L. REV. 189, 195–98 (2009); Scott Hershovitz, Two Models of Tort (and 
Takings), 92 VA. L. REV. 1147, 1157–59 (2006); Saul Levmore, Explaining Restitution, 71 VA. 
L. REV. 65 (1985). Where one cannot collect for positive externalities conferred on others, one 
has less incentive to engage in the activity that generates those spillovers. This does not mean, 
however, that parties will always refrain from activities that generate positive benefits for others; 
they would be expected to engage in them if their internalized returns are high enough to justify 
the activity. In such cases, the positive externalities are Pareto-irrelevant ones. See infra text 
accompanying notes 54–58. 
 47. See, e.g., Fennell, supra note 43, at 1450–52; Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci, Negative 
Liability, 38 J. LEGAL STUD. 21, 25 (2009) (“[A]llowing a party to collect for benefits 
voluntarily conferred would encourage, rather than discourage, the voluntarily bypassing of the 
market.”). For other potential explanations of the limits on restitution, including the law’s 
attempt to identify the “better bargainer,” see Levmore, supra note 46, at 68–81. 
 48. This is of course true of traditional nuisance-like spillovers as well, as Coase famously 
observed in pointing out the reciprocal nature of land use incompatibilities. See R.H. Coase, 
The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 2 (1960). The insight is captured well in the 
maxim “it takes two to tort.” See, e.g., Saul Levmore, Self-Assessed Valuation Systems for Tort 
and Other Law, 68 VA. L. REV. 771, 822 (1982). 
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therefore are more slosh-like), many arise through cumulative and 
often nonlinear effects among many uses in an urban area. 
The interactions between internalized and externalized payoffs 
create potential distortions in behavior, including the initial decision 
about where to locate. Every household or firm will wish to position 
itself to maximize the net positive inputs into its own private income 
and consumption stream that it can derive from the commonly 
owned elements that surround it.49 At the same time, each 
household or firm will be largely indifferent to the magnitude or sign 
of its own contributions to the collective. The next section considers 
whether and how these incentive misalignments are likely to matter. 
C. Plentitude and Irrelevance 
In the city, the tragedy of the commons and the comedy of the 
commons come together—at least potentially. Locating in the city 
may mean imposing costs on others, but staying out of the city may 
deprive others of the benefits of interaction. Which story will be the 
dominant one depends on what is plentiful and what is in short 
supply. If interaction space is plentiful, the need for interacting parties 
(and the associated “energy” or vibrancy) becomes the focus. If 
interacting parties are plentiful relative to the available interaction 
space, however, then congestion becomes salient and the situation 
takes on the cast of an overgrazing tragedy. The two scenarios both 
carry the potential for tragedy: one through underprovision of an 
energy-producing input (human capital) and the other through 
overgrazing of another input essential to the production of a city’s 
energy (space). Because both inputs are necessary to the alchemy that 
takes place within a city, the undersupply of one and the overdrawing 
of the other are both problematic. 
These two problems could conceivably appear together (an 
uncomfortably crowded city that is nonetheless bereft of any useful 
activity). But often the pressure of one of these problems causes the 
other to fade out of view, at least temporarily. Consider a shrinking 
city that is losing population and investment. Underprovision of the 
kind of dynamic agglomerations that spark growth is the pressing 
 
 49. For a helpful recent discussion of the ubiquity of commonly owned elements 
interwoven through private property arrangements, see generally Benkler, supra note 9. In 
addition to infrastructure, however, the agglomeration economies that are produced and the 
overall atmosphere that produces it are part of the urban commons. 
DO NOT DE LETE  9/25/2015 1:47 PM 
1373 Agglomerama 
 1387 
problem. Interaction space, while strictly necessary to carry out any 
plan of revitalization, may not be in any immediate danger of being 
overgrazed. It is, for the moment at least, a plenteous good.50 The 
fact that space may be consumed by economic actors without regard 
for the effects on others is of no consequence because it is not 
currently scarce. But, importantly, its plentitude is an artifact of the 
tragedy of underprovision that is taking center stage. Conversely, 
once congestion becomes a concern, the overuse of space (and 
related resources) may become the focal point, while the need to 
induce optimal human capital contributions takes a back seat. 
Overcorrections may undo not just the congestion but the 
underlying (positive) cause of it.51 
At other times, both inputs—space and human capital—may be 
sufficiently plenteous in supply as to present a “comic” scenario in 
which the commons is less a site of strife than a platform that enables 
actors to freely enjoy and produce reciprocal spillovers that generate 
increasing returns to scale—“the more the merrier.”52 Even within 
the comic narrative, there may be some need to encourage 
participation.53 However, positive externalities of the sort historically 
generated through participation in markets, festivals, and other 
interactive arenas may have required little encouragement. Each 
actor reciprocally gleaned roughly as much from others as she 
contributed to others through her participation—and, importantly, 
was typically contributing and gleaning through the very same 
discrete action in the commons, so that gleaning could not be 
unbundled from contributing. 
These points connect tightly to an important distinction between 
Pareto-relevant and Pareto-irrelevant externalities, which James 
Buchanan and Craig Stubblebine explored in a groundbreaking (but 
still insufficiently appreciated) article.54 An externality that is 
irrelevant to Pareto-efficiency is one whose continued existence (that 
 
 50. See Rose, supra note 5, at 717–18 (discussing plenteous goods). 
 51. The result may resemble a Yogi Berra quip: “No one goes there anymore; it’s too 
crowded.” For an analysis of Berra’s comment in the context of overcrowded taverns, see 
Matthew Yglesias, The Economics of Nobody Goes There Anymore, It’s Too Crowded, SLATE (Aug. 
8, 2012) http://www.slate.com/blogs/moneybox/2012/08/08/the_economics_of_ 
nobody_goes_there_anymore_it_s_too_crowded.html. 
 52. Rose, supra note 5, at 768. 
 53. Id. at 769. 
 54. James M. Buchanan & W. Craig Stubblebine, Externality, 29 ECONOMICA, 
371 (1962). 
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is, the fact that the costs or benefits in question have not been 
internalized to the actor who produces it) does not alter the behavior 
of the actor. A factory that pollutes heedless of its neighbors, but 
that would go on polluting at the same level even if it were forced to 
pay for the harm to its neighbors, is producing an irrelevant negative 
externality. Likewise, a gardener who makes her garden as beautiful 
for her own pleasure as she would make it if her neighbors were 
forced to pay for all the spillover benefits they receive is producing 
an irrelevant positive externality. 
Urban externalities are often irrelevant to efficiency; the actor 
would behave no differently if she were to internalize those effects. 
In the case of a negative externality like crowding, perhaps she would 
still glean enough from being present in a given location to make it 
worth her while even if she had to pay full freight for the costs her 
presence imposes on others. In the case of a positive externality like 
contributions to a city’s overall vitality, it may again be the case that 
the actor would behave no differently even if those effects were 
internalized because her private payoff schedule aligns sufficiently 
with the social optimum. A comedy of the commons story does not 
mean that externalities are absent, but rather that they are (at least 
largely) irrelevant to efficiency.55 
The fact that externalities are irrelevant to efficiency in one time 
and place does not mean they will remain so forever.56 Resources 
such as urban parks that appear nonrival (plenteous) at one level of 
use can become rival (congestible) above that level.57 Likewise, 
contributions to a common enterprise that flow freely under one set 
of circumstances can dry up without much warning.58 Urbanization 
 
 55. Public subsidies in the form of infrastructure or guaranteed access may have worked 
very well historically in bringing participants to the point where self-interest would justify 
actions with positive spillovers. See Rose, supra note 5, at 770 (discussing how public choices 
about roads and waterways encouraged commerce). 
 56. See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 
(PAPERS & PROC.) 347 (1967) (observing that changes in the value of resources can cause 
property rights to emerge, where it becomes worthwhile to bear the costs of defining and 
enforcing them). 
 57. See, e.g., Sheila Foster, Collective Action and the Urban Commons, 87 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 57, 59 (2011) (explaining that overuse can turn an initially nonrival resource like a 
park into a rivalrous one); Carol M. Rose, Rethinking Environmental Controls: Management 
Strategies for Common Resources, 1991 DUKE L.J. 1, 6–7 (1991) (describing the congestion 
point for goods that are plenteous up to a certain consumption level but congestible above 
that level). 
 58. See, e.g., THOMAS C. SCHELLING, MICROMOTIVES AND MACROBEHAVIOR 91–92 
DO NOT DE LETE  9/25/2015 1:47 PM 
1373 Agglomerama 
 1389 
may well have turned positive interactions that were mostly self-
perpetuating affairs in the past into far more economically significant, 
heterogeneous, and fragile phenomena, while bringing the problems 
of congestion to the forefront. 
II. HETEROGENEITY IN THE COMMONS 
The prototypical commons tragedy assumes homogeneity among 
the players: all cattle are standard issue, delivering equal benefits to 
their owners and visiting equal harms upon the commons. In an 
urban context, we must contend not only with a mix of positive and 
negative externalities but also with great heterogeneity among actors 
in their ability to generate, magnify, absorb, and deflect these 
impacts. Because participants in a commons are both producers and 
consumers, the characteristics and behaviors of the participants 
influence the nature of their joint product.59 Product degradation 
can occur not just through outright crowding, but also as a result of 
the opportunity costs of having suboptimal contributors in place, 
whether they are actually putting bads into the commons or simply 
failing to contribute as much as another participant would.60 
Section A offers a stylized look at heterogeneity by considering 
the significance of variation along two dimensions: capacity to 
generate urban vitality or “energy” and contributions to congestion 
or “clog.” Section B explains why existing market structures and 
self-selection do not resolve the participant assembly problem that 
urban interaction space presents. Section C notes the complications 
that arise when location decisions have impacts at multiple scales 
(e.g., both within and between municipalities). 
A. Energy Versus Clog 
Both agglomeration benefits (“energy”) and congestion costs 
 
(1978) (describing how the dynamics of interdependent choice can unravel collective projects, 
and giving the example of a “dying seminar”). 
 59. See supra text accompanying notes 11–15; see also Lee Anne Fennell, Beyond Exit 
and Voice: User Participation in the Production of Local Public Goods, 80 TEX. L. REV. 
1 (2001). 
 60. See, e.g., Ronit Levine-Schnur, Agreements Between Local Governments and Private 
Entrepreneurs as a Means for Urban Development 43–54, 157–66 (August 2014) 
(unpublished dissertation) (on file with author) (discussing differential contributions to and 
draws from urban surpluses made by different actors, and examining the possibility of taking 
these factors into account in bargains over development rights). 
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(“clog”) rise as additional economic actors are added to an urban 
area. But these benefits and costs do not rise at the same rate. 
Agglomeration produces increasing returns to scale, at least within a 
certain range. At some point, however, the increasing marginal costs 
of congestion catch up with agglomeration benefits. If all economic 
actors were equivalent and fungible, we would simply add more 
actors to an area until the marginal congestion costs thereby 
generated were just equal to the marginal agglomeration benefits 
produced. But because economic actors are not fungible, the 
particular combination of actors determines how many is too many. 
The optimizing mix of actors will also vary over time due to the 
availability of co-locators and the surrounding social and 
economic conditions. 
Introducing heterogeneity among actors along just two 
dimensions reveals important aspects of the problem. Suppose there 
are four types of economic actors (either firms or households) who 
might locate within a given urban area, classifiable based on their 
ability and propensity to contribute to agglomeration economies 
(energy) and congestion costs (clog). 
 
Table 1: 
Heterogeneous Actors 
 Low Clog High Clog 
High Energy Buzz Builders Massive Movers 
Low Energy Lackluster Lites Space-Eating Slugs  
 
Energy, as used here, stands in for a wide range of synergies and 
agglomeration economies associated with proximity. Clog represents 
a constraint on the ability to use proximity to generate and consume 
energy. Obvious clogs include dead space that must be traversed, 
uncomfortably crowded conditions, and other hassles that must be 
endured to partake of the energy within an urban space. 
As shown in Table 1, the intersection of these two characteristics 
gives us two extremes: desirable “buzz builders” who contribute a 
great deal to the city’s energy while generating very little clog, and 
“space-eating slugs” who contribute a great deal to clog and very 
little to urban energy. An example of the former might be an 
exciting new high tech firm that employs many creative workers but 
does not demand a large physical plant, while an example of the 
latter might be a large surface parking lot that is mostly 
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underutilized. Table 1 also includes two intermediate cases: 
“lackluster lites” who have little impact on a city’s energy or its 
congestion (here, consider apartment residents who rarely leave the 
building) and “massive movers” who have large impacts on both 
(think big box stores, amusement parks, stadiums, and large 
industrial plants).61 
Private decisions about location (as shaped by public policy and 
land use regulations) can make the difference between a lively urban 
area filled with buzz builders and a domain of space-eating slugs. 
Increasing one’s energy quotient and reducing one’s contributions 
to clog are both costly. More fundamentally, not all actors are 
equally equipped to play each of the roles in Table 1. Indeed, it may 
be impossible for some households or firms to reduce their clog 
footprint or increase their energy quotient. But as long as the private 
payoff remains attractive, such actors will continue to locate in places 
that could generate more value if occupied by an actor with a 
different energy-to-clog ratio. 
There is a great deal that Table 1’s simplification leaves out. 
Perhaps most significantly, the ability of an economic actor to 
contribute to energy or to produce clog is not an immutable fact 
but rather depends on what other actors and uses are nearby. 
Nonetheless, even the highly stylized presentation of heterogeneity 
developed here will help to illustrate why existing markets for urban 
interaction space are incomplete. 
B. Assembly Failures 
We might initially wonder why we cannot rely on markets to 
assemble urban participants optimally, just as we usually rely on 
markets to channel other goods and services to their highest 
valuers.62 For now, let us assume that actors are making location 
decisions independently, without any formal or informal mechanisms 
for coordinating their choices.63 If there were no interaction effects 
 
 61. Within the microcosm of a shopping mall, anchor stores would be the “massive 
movers.” See Eric D. Gould et al., Contracts, Externalities, and Incentives in Shopping Malls, 87 
REV. ECON. & STAT. 411, 411 (2005) (explaining that in a typical mall, anchor stores “are 
responsible for attracting most of the consumer traffic to the mall” and “[o]n average, . . . 
occupy over 58% of the total leasable space in the mall”). 
 62.  The idea of a “location market” was helpfully explored in Rodriguez & Schleicher, 
supra note 16. 
  63.  Of course, a number of potential coordination mechanisms do exist, some of which 
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among co-locating firms and households, these independent 
decisions would work well: The person who paid the most for a 
given parcel would be the one who enjoyed its attributes the most or 
had the skills to derive the most profit from those attributes. Thus, a 
parcel containing an isolated cabin and a grove of trees would be 
purchased by the person who enjoyed viewing the trees the most, 
liked the cabin’s design the most, or could most profitably turn trees 
into products like fence posts and tables. 
However, a primary defining attribute of any parcel is its location 
relative to other land uses and land users, not just the objects or 
amenities that the parcel itself contains or provides. In the urban 
context, this factor takes on overwhelming significance.64 We might 
expect the benefits and detriments of proximity to co-locators to get 
capitalized into the value of the property and become part of the 
package that parties bid against each other to acquire.65 Uncertainty 
about the magnitude and valence of those impacts might be an issue, 
but land use controls can help to stabilize expectations,66 even if they 
do so imperfectly.67 
Expected impacts do more than influence property values; they 
also generate selection effects. Thus, other things equal, we might 
expect urban areas to be populated by economic actors who are most 
resilient to negative externalities in the area and most benefited by 
positive externalities. For example, households without children who 
are not as concerned about low-level criminality and who especially 
 
will be addressed below. See id., at 658–62; infra Part III. 
 64. Indeed, at a broad level, the overwhelming significance of this factor is an important 
explanation for urbanization itself. See, e.g., GLAESER, supra note 28, at 5 (“Agglomeration 
economies are the catchall explanation for why cities can be so productive and why so many 
people flock to urban areas.”). 
 65. See, e.g., WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS 6–7 (2001) 
(discussing capitalization of local amenities and services into home prices). 
 66. See, e.g., LEE ANNE FENNELL, THE UNBOUNDED HOME 39–44 (2009) (discussing 
land use controls as “product stabilizers”); Michelle J. White & Donald Wittman, Optimal 
Spatial Location Under Pollution: Liability Rules and Zoning, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 249, 266 
(1981) (explaining how zoning “shifts the burden of forecasting future land-use patterns” and 
thereby “reduces uncertainty”). 
 67. For one thing, such controls are subject to political change, including piecemeal 
adjustments attained through ad hoc bargains. Whether the prevalence of such changes is a 
feature or a bug is the subject of debate. See, e.g., Roderick M. Hills, Jr. & David Schleicher, 
City Replanning 20–36 (Aug. 9, 2014) (manuscript) (George Mason Univ. Law and Econ. 
Research Paper Series 14-32), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2477125 (discussing and 
challenging favorable views of piecemeal, ad hoc bargaining over land use regulation). 
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enjoy proximity to restaurants and nightclubs will be willing to 
outbid households who feel the negative effects of urban life more 
sharply and who are relatively less appreciative of its charms. 
Likewise, firms that can benefit from knowledge spillovers or foot 
traffic associated with neighboring firms will have more to gain from 
locating near others, and those whose customers do not mind 
crowds and difficult parking will have less to lose from congestion. 
All of these preferences will be reflected in the amounts that parties 
are willing to pay for the location. 
Yet we cannot fully rely on markets and sorting to generate 
optimal agglomerations.68 This is so even if we set aside potential 
distortions arising from land use controls.69 The problem is this: 
the party who is the high bidder for the location in question will 
herself generate a stream of negative and positive externalities by 
virtue of her location choice. The cash price that she pays for the 
location is insensitive to what she does or does not bring to the 
table in terms of negative and positive spillovers—that is, whether 
her specific land use operates as a buzz builder, a space-eating slug, 
or something in between. If cash prices were the sole basis for 
allocating urban locations, a buzz builder who would add a large 
premium in kind to the community could be outbid by a space-
eating slug for a prime spot in urban interaction space.70 
To be sure, such a distortion would not occur if the propensity 
to add positive externalities to an area were tightly correlated with 
one’s own valuation of that area—if, to use the terminology above, 
only a buzz builder could thrive in spots where buzz building would 
be valuable. In that case, being the high bidder based on one’s own 
valuation would offer a good proxy for being the best contributor to 
the area. Such correlations are sometimes quite plausible. For 
example, it has been suggested that a high tech firm’s “absorptive 
capacity”—its ability to benefit from the research and development 
 
 68. For distinct but related critiques, see id. at 34–36 (suggesting sorting is an 
incomplete response to excessive land use regulation); Schleicher, supra note 4 at 1535–45 
(noting tension between sorting and agglomeration). 
 69. Land use controls structure and limit the “location market,” and there is little 
reason to expect that they do so optimally. See generally Rodriguez & Schleicher, supra 
note 16. 
  70.  Government policies, including land use controls, also play a major role in 
regulating access to urban locations, as do various forms of private action. See generally id. See 
infra Part III. 
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(R&D) efforts of other firms—may depend on its own spillover-
producing R&D efforts.71 Similarly, perhaps households who enjoy 
crowds and excitement and therefore seek out urban residential areas 
are the very same people who are best positioned to contribute ideas 
and creativity to the commons. But the opposite might also be true. 
For example, a wealthy middle-aged couple might wish to soak up 
the hip ambience of a trendy neighborhood but might do little or 
nothing to help maintain the neighborhood’s hipness against the 
influx of moneyed, unhip people such as themselves. Meanwhile, 
other people who would be excellent contributors in terms of ideas 
and creativity may flee clogged conditions for ones more conducive 
to their particular style of working. 
In sum, the characteristics that cause particular economic actors 
to derive the most value from a given location may or may not be 
the same characteristics that would lead them to contribute the most 
value to that location. Here, as in other commons situations, there is 
a potential mismatch between the privately owned element (access to 
a given location) and the commonly owned one (the overall urban 
atmosphere).72 The share of the commons that one’s private location 
affords cannot be properly priced unless the price accounts for the 
benefits or detriments that the locating party will herself be adding 
or deducting in kind by virtue of locating there. 
While the failure to account for the locator’s own impacts may 
be the most fundamental source of market failure, other factors also 
drive a wedge between the social payoffs from a given location 
choice and the locator’s expected private payoffs. Instead of choosing 
immobile attributes (e.g., a cabin and trees) that are confined within 
a given parcel of land, an actor who chooses an urban location is 
choosing a set of neighbors and prospective neighbors whose 
identities and activities lie outside the chooser’s control and cannot 
be reliably predicted.73 Significantly, she recognizes that each new in-
 
 71. Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257, 269 
(2007) (footnote omitted) (suggesting that “investments in R&D may increase a firm’s 
capacity to absorb spillovers from competitors and/or other industries altogether,” providing 
“an incentive to develop ‘absorptive capacity’ for inevitable spillovers by investing in R&D”); 
see also Rodriguez & Schleicher, supra note 16, at 651 (observing that only select groups are 
well-positioned to capture certain kinds of spillovers and giving the example of a lobbyist who 
would provide useful spillovers to another lobbyist but would be “a bore” to most others). 
 72. See supra Part I.B.1. 
 73. See, e.g., Lee Anne Fennell, Crowdsourcing Land Use, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 385, 388–
402 (2013) (discussing various “informational shortfalls” about land uses and users, and some 
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mover, like she herself, will not internalize all the impacts that are 
generated by the location choice. In addition to directly adjacent 
parcels that may literally produce cross-boundary spillovers for a 
given actor, more distantly located economic actors will also 
influence a given locator’s payoffs. Even if expected values can be 
calculated, risk-averse actors may underbid for locations where 
property values are expected to exhibit high levels of variation. 
Future governmental decisions as well as future private decisions 
can add uncertainty. The value of land to an economic actor depends 
crucially on whether her preferred uses of the land are (or will be) 
both (a) legally permitted, and (b) practically possible given the land 
use rights given to others. A legal restriction could rule out a 
preferred use, but so too could a conflicting nearby use that is (or 
becomes) legally permissible. For example, keeping livestock might 
become impermissible as a city expands (which could thwart the 
expectations of ranchers) or keeping livestock might remain 
permissible through a “right to farm” act (which could thwart the 
expectations of those planning residential development nearby).74 
Government restrictions on land use can narrow the uncertainty 
associated with the behavior of private actors, but they can also 
introduce new uncertainties associated with the effects of 
government action—and inaction.75 
Finally, I have assumed to this point that there is an active 
“bidding” process that stands ready to move property into the hands 
of higher valuers (even if those valuations are distorted in the ways 
already suggested). But property rights that are physically rooted and 
perpetual in duration can impede the movement of resources into 
higher valued uses. Local property owners have a monopoly on their 
particular parts of the urban scape—one that may become especially 
significant where a shift to a larger scale of use (like a large 
development project) would add value.76 The possibility of strategic 
 
ways they might be mitigated); Thomas C. Schelling, Dynamic Models of Segregation, 1 J. 
MATHEMATICAL SOC. 143, 145 (1971) (“To choose a neighborhood is to 
choose neighbors.”). 
 74. See, e.g., ELLICKSON ET AL., LAND USE CONTROLS 547 (4th ed. 2013) (describing 
right-to-farm legislation, which protects those with ongoing agricultural operations against 
nuisance actions under specified circumstances). 
 75. See, e.g., Christopher Serkin, Passive Takings: The State’s Affirmative Duty to Protect 
Property, 113 MICH. L. REV. 345 (2014). 
 76. See, e.g., Michael Heller & Rick Hills, Land Assembly Districts, 121 HARV. L. REV. 
1465, 1473 (2008) (observing that land assembly situations turn existing owners into 
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behavior among potential sellers in an effort to glean more surplus 
from an assembly effort presents familiar holdout problems that can 
impede movement of property to a more valuable use.77 
C. Multi-Jurisdictional Locational Choice 
Another complication associated with heterogeneity involves the 
patterns in which economic actors—households and firms—array 
themselves across jurisdictions within a metropolitan area.78 These 
choices generate gains and losses for the choosers as well as for 
society at large. Because of the ways in which choices combine to 
generate negative and positive agglomeration effects, locational 
choices within urban areas are a positive-sum game—not a zero-sum 
proposition in which each gain to City A is perfectly balanced out by 
a loss to Suburb B, and vice versa. This would be true even in the 
absence of heterogeneity as long as adding participants to a given 
subarea produces nonlinear returns. But heterogeneity makes the 
problem more complicated and raises the stakes associated with 
solving it; it is no longer a matter of just managing numbers across 
jurisdictions, but also of optimizing along other dimensions. 
I have written elsewhere about some of the dynamics and 
interdependencies that characterize choices among jurisdictions 
within a metropolitan area, and I will not revisit those points in 
detail here.79 But it is worth emphasizing that there are two sets of 
opportunity costs associated with each locational choice. First, each 
locating firm or household occupies rival interaction space that keeps 
some other firm or household out of that space. Second, each 
locating firm or household, by placing its locational investment here 
and not there, is removing from the metropolitan pattern the 
alternative locational investment that it could have made. Thus, 
 
“monopoly suppliers”). 
 77. This is, of course, a primary justification for eminent domain. See, e.g., Thomas W. 
Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 61 (1986). 
 78. Households and firms make choices between metropolitan areas as well. Although I 
am not focusing on those choices here, similar dynamics keep intermetropolitan choices from 
being zero-sum. See, e.g., Paul Krugman, Op-Ed., Wrong Way Nation, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 
2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/25/opinion/paul-krugman-wrong-way-
nation.html (arguing that households relocating to the south and west are doing so because of 
affordable housing, not because of better opportunities, and that housing policy should enable 
them to stay in the northeast and in California where their productivity would be higher). 
 79. See FENNELL, supra note 66; Fennell, supra note 59; Lee Anne Fennell, Properties of 
Concentration, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 1227 (2006). 
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getting economic actors into the places where they can do the most 
good means keeping them out places where they will block better 
contributors or squander their own contributions. 
The problems are too complex to untangle here, but raising the 
issue of multiple jurisdictions does suggest two things. First, some 
degree of mitigation may be in the picture even when location 
decisions are distorted. Household A is priced out of its most socially 
valuable spot in the center city, perhaps, but makes outstanding 
contributions in the suburban neighborhood where it eventually 
locates. Even though there is a social loss, the loss is not complete 
because Household A still locates somewhere in the metro area and 
is still contributing to the urban agglomeration, even at a lower level. 
Second, as this example suggests, there may be interesting 
distributive effects that flow from inefficient location decisions. Thus, 
having high-energy households like Household A scattered among 
the hinterlands could produce benefits for those who would never be 
competitive to locate in the central city in an undistorted market. 
This is true even if we posit that the hinterlands gain less from 
Household A than the core city would. Maximizing agglomeration 
benefits across a system may produce a harmful stratification that is 
somewhat mitigated by the location “errors” an imperfect 
system produces. 
In the balance of the piece, I will focus not on the difficult 
question of how best to arrange economic units within a 
metropolitan area, but rather on how existing tools fail to grapple 
with smaller-scale agglomeration economies—and how new tools 
might do a better job. 
III. PURSUING PARTICIPANT ASSEMBLY 
Urban areas comprise a conjoined set: (1) a congestible resource 
(interaction space) that is subject to overharvest, and (2) a strictly 
complementary public good (web of agglomeration benefits) that is 
subject to underinvestment. Dodging tragedies of overharvesting 
and underinvestment depends crucially on the characteristics and 
capacities of economic actors who are assembled together in the 
interaction space, and not just on their day-to-day behaviors.80 
 
 80. Both location choices and behavioral choices matter to externalities. Cf. Gould et 
al., supra note 61, at 419 (explaining that in the shopping mall context, “[e]xternalities are 
generated not only by the presence of certain stores, but also by the actions the stores take, 
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Solving the commons problems playing out within cities, therefore, 
requires going beyond mere crowd control or regulation to tackle 
the intricate task of optimally assembling participants. 
I have already suggested why market-assisted self-selection 
cannot achieve optimal participant assembly on its own.81 Section A 
explains why existing land use controls are not very good at solving 
participant assembly problems as they exist in urban areas. Section B 
considers a range of strategies that might be able to better harness 
urban energy while controlling clog. 
A. Shortfalls in Traditional Land Use Controls 
Scholars have recently criticized land use law for focusing almost 
exclusively on negative externalities and neglecting positive 
externalities.82 This critique requires refinement. In fact, the line 
between negative and positive externalities is illusory, since nearly 
every impact can be characterized in either way. Pigou’s work offers 
a classic example: when discussing smoke pollution, which might 
seem like an obvious negative externality,83 Pigou observed how 
keeping one’s chimney from emitting smoke conferred a positive 
externality.84 And while it is indeed unusual for the law to require 
those who benefit from a spillover to fork over payment for it,85 the 
law very commonly mandates actions that can be readily understood 
 
such as advertising, maintaining cleanliness, courtesy, and product variety”). Both can be 
affected by land use controls. See, e.g., FENNELL, supra note 66, at 123–26 (distinguishing 
“compliance effects” of land use restrictions from “membership effects” that determine who 
locates in the community); Michael J. Pogodzinski & Tim R. Sass, The Economic Theory of 
Zoning: A Critical Review, 66 LAND ECON. 294, 295 (1990) (distinguishing “direct” effects 
of land use controls from those generated by mobility). However, because location decisions 
are a necessary predicate to behavioral decisions in the presence of heterogeneity, the former 
are my primary focus here. 
 81. See supra Part II.B. 
 82. See, e.g., Parchomovsky & Siegelman, supra note 6, at 223–30. 
 83. See id. at 220–21 (citing Pigou in discussing significance of negative externalities in 
law and economics). 
 84. A.C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 160–61 (1920) (noting that “resources 
devoted to the prevention of smoke from factory chimneys” represent “uncompensated 
services” while the smoke itself “inflicts a heavy uncharged loss on the community”); see also 
Coase, supra note 48, at 35 (discussing Pigou’s characterization of those who keep their 
chimneys from smoking as “render[ing] services for which they receive no payment”); James 
E. Krier, The Tragedy of the Commons, Part Two, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 325, 325 n.3 
(1992) (discussing Pigou’s view of pollution control as generating a positive externality). 
 85. See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
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as requiring parties to reciprocally confer benefits on each other.86 
Consider, for example, zoning provisions that restrict land use in 
a given area to residential housing on lots of a certain size or that 
require setbacks and minimum spacing between buildings. By 
complying with these restrictions, each landowner contributes in 
kind to a collective result.87 Similarly, design requirements may aim 
to improve the appearance of an area, or residential community 
covenants may require homeowners to provide (or fund the 
provision of) lawn care, fence maintenance, and the like. All of these 
examples and many more could be characterized as addressing 
negative externalities (the ones that would flow from building too 
close to the lot line or using lower quality facade materials, for 
example), but they can also readily be characterized as mandating 
acts that confer positive externalities on others. 
The real problem with standard land use controls relates not to 
the distinction between positive and negative externalities, which is 
largely a matter of framing,88 but rather to the way that these 
controls typically operate. Traditional land use controls are primarily 
designed to control cross-boundary spillovers from on-parcel 
activities—what I termed “sloshes” in the earlier discussion.89 They 
do so by directly addressing what can, must, and must not be done 
on the owned parcel. Presumed incompatible uses are banned 
wholesale in particular zones (as by separating industrial and 
residential uses), and specific behaviors expected to produce 
spillovers (like burning trash or keeping too many pets) are regulated 
at a finer grain. 
Moreover, with some exceptions to be discussed below,90 land 
use controls address spillovers by applying categorically across a 
particular zone, neighborhood, or district. This works well in 
keeping everyone within the area up to a particular standard, but 
there is a limit to how much can realistically be demanded in terms 
 
 86. For discussion of some other ways that the law addresses positive externalities 
outside of restitution, see Dari-Mattiacci, supra note 47, at 49–54. 
 87. See, e.g., Davy, supra note 9, at 481–83 (discussing the significance of space in front 
of and between buildings); Karkkainen, supra note 9, at 68–69 (noting features of the 
neighborhood commons, including “the physical environment”). 
  88. See generally Lisa Grow Sun & Brigham Daniels, Mirrored Externalities, 90 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 135 (2014) (examining the susceptibility of externalities to alternative frames 
and exploring the determinants and significance of externality framing). 
  89. See supra Part I.B.3. 
 90. See infra Part III.B.3. 
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of positive contributions from residents and businesses. Requiring 
that everyone use premium building materials is one thing, but 
creating a culture in which ideas flow freely across firms is another. 
Still harder is ensuring that the participants attracted to particular 
locations have the sorts of shareable ideas that will combine in ways 
that generate value. 
To return to the earlier terminology, “sloshes” are easy for land 
use controls to address, but “sparks” are not. Sparks are harder to 
reach because their impact and magnitude depend on the 
contributions—and hence in part on the characteristics—of other 
actors who are nearby in time and space. Sparks thus represent 
contingent contributions to public goods or bads—the energy of a 
vibrant city or the pall of a dangerous or depressed one. Because 
these public goods or bads may have a “lumpy” production 
function—requiring a “critical mass” to produce significant results—
relatively small differences in inputs can make large differences in 
outputs, and vice versa.91 Law enforcement efforts may attempt to 
break apart bad synergies (such as gangs) to leave room for good 
ones (such as play groups), but some of the more economically 
important positive externalities—creating a rich intellectual climate 
or a world-class music scene—cannot realistically be mandated. 
It might seem that the answer lies in ever more restrictive and 
fine-grained zoning classifications that would ensure landowners are 
clustered together in groupings with other landowners who will 
contribute to particular agglomeration benefits. Even if governments 
had the necessary information to pursue such a strategy—a doubtful 
proposition—there remain two problems with this approach. The 
first is that the ability of a particular industry type to contribute to a 
metropolitan area’s agglomeration benefits will fluctuate over time. 
Focusing on just one use cuts against a diversification strategy.92 For 
 
 91. See, e.g., THOMAS C. SCHELLING, MICROMOTIVES AND MACROBEHAVIOR, 91–110 
(1978) (discussing the dynamics of a “critical mass”); Pamela Oliver et al., A Theory of the Critical 
Mass. I. Interdependence, Group Heterogeneity, and the Production of Collective Action, 91 AM. J. 
SOC. 522 (1985) (same); Michael Taylor & Hugh Ward, Chickens, Whales, and Lumpy Goods: 
Alternative Models of Public-Goods Provision, 30 POL. STUD. 350, 353 (1982) (discussing 
“lumpy” goods). 
 92. See, e.g., MARSHALL, supra note 22, at IV.X.12 §3 (discussing the risks of an area 
relying on a single industry and observing that this risk can be countered by developing 
“several distinct industries”); Henderson, supra note 23, at 246 (noting the insurance-like 
quality of diversification) (quoting E.M. HOOVER, THE LOCATION OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 
288 (1948)). 
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example, designating a particular area of the city for automobile sales 
may ensure a critical mass of such uses and create fully reciprocal 
positive spillovers among them. But if the appetite for car-shopping 
wanes, those reciprocal spillovers will dwindle—and the space taken 
up by the entire cluster within the downtown area will begin to exert 
a negative impact (which is to say lack of a positive impact) on the 
surrounding properties.93 
A second problem with relying on zoning categories or similar 
sorting techniques to push together uses that emit reciprocal positive 
externalities is more fundamental: it effectively requires that claims 
on prime agglomeration space be paid for in kind with one’s own 
similar agglomerative contributions. This tends toward a kind of 
“monoculture” that not only heightens the concern raised above but 
may also impede complementarities among different types of uses, 
and among firms and households of different sizes or different 
positions in their life cycles.94 Although the question is an empirical 
one, it seems strange to think that an efficient market would specify 
that all bids for preferred locations must be made in kind by 
proffering one’s own identical or similar use.95 
B. Alternative Strategies 
If traditional land use controls perform poorly on the participant 
assembly task that is at the heart of agglomeration benefits, what 
might work better? The sections below consider some alternatives, 
ranging from minor modifications of existing approaches to more 
radical ways of restructuring property rights. 
1. Supersizing 
Could urban agglomerations be optimized by simply 
 
 93. Cf. Billy Graham Evangelistic Ass’n v. City of Minneapolis, 667 N.W.2d 117 (Minn. 
2003) (upholding historic preservation designation for area described as the past “hub of the 
automotive sales district in Minneapolis”). 
 94. Empirical work investigating the impact of industry diversity on urban productivity 
has reached mixed results, depending on the measure of diversity employed. See, e.g., Combes 
& Gobillon, supra note 17, at 274–78, 309–10, 319–21 (reviewing studies). Regardless of 
exactly how industry diversity plays out citywide, however, there is reason to doubt the efficacy 
of a pervasive strategy of artificially constraining variety at small urban scales. Cf. JAMES C. 
SCOTT, SEEING LIKE A STATE, 11–22 (1998) (describing failures of tree monoculture). 
 95. See generally Rodriguez & Schleicher, supra note 16 (discussing how land use 
restrictions affect the “location market”). 
DO NOT DE LETE  9/25/2015 1:47 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2014 
1402 
consolidating (much) more property in the hands of a single owner? 
A recent paper by Gideon Parchomovsky and Peter Siegelman 
suggests an affirmative answer.96 Drawing on the model of shopping 
malls, Parchomovsky and Siegelman note the potential for a single 
owner to optimally manage positive spillovers among heterogeneous 
tenants by charging differential rents—less for an “anchor store” 
who brings in traffic, more for a small operation that benefits from 
the anchor’s presence.97 They recommend that local governments 
condemn large blocks of land through eminent domain and auction 
off the consolidated parcels to private parties to own and manage.98 
The proposal echoes in some respects a thought experiment that 
Peter Colwell once posed, in which he suggested that zoning would 
be unnecessary if parties were required to own very large tracts of 
land, such as a minimum of 640 acres.99 
At the level of theory, the single-owner test is a useful heuristic.100 
By asking how a single owner would resolve a given land use 
incompatibility if she owned all of the elements in the story (both the 
polluting factory and the polluted-upon neighborhood, say), we can 
derive the decisions that would obtain under zero-transaction-cost 
conditions.101 It is a short logical step to the idea that supersizing 
ownership holdings could reduce land use conflicts and, most relevant 
to the discussion here, optimize positive interactions among 
complementary uses. But consolidating ownership in this way has a 
number of drawbacks. 
 
 96. Parchomovsky & Siegelman, supra note 6. 
 97. Id. at 241–45. Parchomovksy and Siegelman build on earlier work examining the 
economics of shopping mall leasing practices. See, e.g., Pashigian & Gould, supra note 12. 
 98. Parchomovsky & Siegelman, supra note 6, at 247–57; see also Pashigian & Gould, 
supra note 12, at 141 (observing that “giving developers the opportunity to develop blocks of 
condemned space instead of individual parcels has much to recommend itself because 
developers will take account of the externalities among stores”). Parchomovsky and Siegelman 
also discuss the alternative of having the government retain ownership itself. Parchomovsky & 
Siegelman, supra note 6, at 253–55. 
 99. Peter F. Colwell, Tender Mercies: Efficient and Equitable Land Use Change, 25 REAL 
EST. ECON. 525, 529 n.6 (1997). This approach assumes there would be some rules about 
what could occur near the edges of the property. See id. The purchase of large tracts of land is 
of course sometimes voluntarily sought in order to internalize positive externalities. See 
ELLICKSON ET AL., supra note 74, at 573 (recounting Disney Corporation’s decision, after its 
experience with Disneyland, to assemble a tract one hundred times larger for Disney World). 
 100. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Holdouts, Externalities, and the Single Owner: One 
More Salute to Ronald Coase, 36 J.L. & ECON. 553, 556–57 (1993) (describing “the test of 
the ‘single owner’”). 
  101. See id. 
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First, although larger holdings do eliminate transaction costs in 
negotiating over spillovers by simply internalizing the whole 
operation, another set of problems emerges. Whether denominated 
as agency costs, management costs, internal transaction costs, or 
something else, the costs of internally managing the holdings of 
even the most talented “single owner” are likely to prove 
nontrivial.102 In the present context, one of the costs of internal 
management will be leaseholds, which themselves present moral 
hazard issues and introduce new problems of misaligned 
incentives.103 This does not mean that consolidation is necessarily 
the inefficient choice—we would need to know how these costs 
compare to the costs of working out externalities with others, or 
simply leaving them uninternalized—but it is not a magic bullet 
that eliminates all sources of conflict. 
Second, consolidation of property holdings can produce a variety 
of social costs, from diminished competition to the loss of the local 
knowledge that dispersed owners can collectively possess and 
employ.104 In addition, a large block of land owned by one party may 
lack the diversity and eclecticism that arises organically from many 
separately owned interests, and hence may be less generative of 
positive benefits. In short, there are diseconomies of scale as well as 
economies of scale, and large property holdings may at times 
introduce as many problems as they solve. Whether this will be the 
case may depend in part on the scale at which single ownership is 
undertaken. Because agglomeration benefits are generated in a 
variety of ways at a variety of scales, it is possible that consolidated 
ownership could manage relatively small-scale micro-
 
 102. See, e.g., Coase, supra note 48, at 16; Fred S. McChesney, Coase, Demsetz, and the 
Unending Externality Debate, 26 CATO J. 179, 190–91 (2006). 
 103. See, e.g., Derek K.Y. Chau, Michael Firth & Bin Srinidhi, Leases with Purchase 
Options and Double Moral Hazard, 33 J. BUS. FIN. & ACCT. 1390, 1391 (2006) (describing 
“double moral hazard” in leasehold arrangements, with misaligned incentives for both landlord 
and tenant); Edward L. Glaeser, Rethinking the Federal Bias toward Homeownership, 13 
CITYSCAPE: J. POL’Y DEV. & RES., no. 2, 2011, at 5, 6 (suggesting ownership of a detached 
single-family dwelling is generally best held by the resident, because she “is in the best position 
to make investments”). 
 104. See Thomas W. Merrill, The Property Strategy, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 2061, 2094 (2012) 
(noting that “[i]f only a small number of people own property, then the property strategy loses its 
advantage of tapping into dispersed local knowledge,” and pointing out other disadvantages of 
concentrated ownership, including dampened incentives and fewer checks against 
concentrated power). 
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agglomerations105 by locating a handful of complementary stores 
together, even if it could not cost-effectively manage larger-scale 
agglomerations within an urban area. 
Another drawback of the supersized ownership approach relates 
to the start-up costs involved. Parchomovsky and Siegelman 
contemplate the use of eminent domain to acquire sufficiently large 
tracts of land to be managed in this manner.106 Eminent domain is 
costly and not always politically feasible, even where it is legally 
available.107 Yet the alternative of privately assembling land may be 
prohibitively costly.108 Holdout problems that impede land assembly 
might be addressed through more fundamental revisions in property 
rights, as discussed below.109 But as things stand, there are significant 
practical impediments to undertaking an ownership consolidation 
strategy on a broad scale. 
An alternative to supersizing actual ownership would be to devise 
a mechanism that would entwine the fates of neighboring economic 
actors. Fleshing out the forms that this approach might take is too 
large a task to take on here, but one possible model might make use 
of derivative instruments keyed to the market outcomes that are 
enjoyed or suffered by surrounding owners. Suppose, for example, 
that a local government zoned a particular district as an “interaction 
zone” and required all businesses locating within it to hold derivative 
instruments indexed to the stock prices of co-locating businesses and 
to the property values of nearby residences.110 Businesses that 
 
 105. See Rodriguez & Schleicher, supra note 16, at 647 (distinguishing agglomeration 
effects that operate at the regional level from “microagglomerations” at the scale of groups 
of stores or residents). 
 106. Parchomovsky & Siegelman, supra note 6, at 218. 
 107. Consider in this connection the tremendous popular backlash that followed the 
decision in Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005), which upheld the exercise of 
eminent domain against a public use challenge. 
 108. This is an empirical question. For one take on the issue, see Daniel B. Kelly, The 
“Public Use” Requirement in Eminent Domain: A Rationale Based on Secret Purchases and 
Private Influence, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 18–24 (2006) (suggesting private assembly may 
often be possible, given the ability of private parties to assemble land secretly using 
buying agents). 
 109. See infra Part III.B.5. 
 110. A great number of operational details and safeguards would have to be hammered 
out, from determining appropriate stakes, to preventing parties from hedging the risk 
associated with the required stakes, to ensuring that the approach did not produce or 
perpetuate discriminatory behavior or patterns. The idea of requiring stakes as a way of 
aligning incentives is not wholly unprecedented. See, e.g., David M. Schizer, Executives and 
Hedging: The Fragile Legal Foundation of Incentive Compatibility, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 440 
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expected to have net positive impacts on their neighbors would have 
an extra incentive to locate in such a zone, while those who would 
derive benefits from others without contributing positively to the 
area would effectively pay a premium for locating there. The result 
might be an assembly pattern that is closer to what a single owner 
would produce, without the associated drawbacks of 
consolidated ownership. 
2. Paying for buzz 
Where it is possible to identify a particular economic actor who 
produces asymmetric benefits for neighbors, a different strategy is 
possible—that of directly charging nearby parties for the benefits that 
they receive. In general, the law does not require payments from 
those who receive gratuitous benefits from others, apart from a few 
narrow categories of restitution.111 Ariel Porat argues for an 
Expanded Duty of Restitution (EDR) that would require payments 
from those who receive unrequested benefits in a broader set of 
circumstances.112 If such payments were mandatory, the argument 
runs, then more activities that produce positive externalities would 
be encouraged. 
Whatever merits such an idea might have in cases where a single 
actor engages in a discrete act that produces plainly valuable benefits 
for identifiable others, it is unlikely to offer much traction in 
addressing urban agglomerations.113 Perhaps the most promising 
urban application would be where a unique economic entity such as 
an entertainment venue nonreciprocally generates benefits for the 
 
(2000) (discussing potential of stock options in executive compensation to produce incentive 
compatibility where hedging is absent); see also Gideon Parchomovsky & Endre Stavang, The 
Green Option, 99 MINN. L. REV. 967 (2015) (proposing a model in which large companies 
might be required to take a stake in “green” enterprises); Lee Anne Fennell & Julie A. Roin, 
Controlling Residential Stakes, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 143, 174–75 (2010) (describing a model in 
which neighboring jurisdictions would share risk by buying instruments indexed to each 
other’s property values). 
 111. See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
 112. Porat, supra note 46, at 205–14. 
 113. Porat places a number of limits on the domain of his proposed EDR so that it would 
not apply in, inter alia, categories of cases where the risk of overvaluation or costs of 
enforcement are unduly high. See, id. at 226. Presumably these conditions would rule out the 
use of the EDR to sort out complex urban agglomeration benefits, although Porat does discuss 
applying EDR in instances in which the acts of one party increase the property value of 
another. See e.g., id. at 191 (providing an example in which a property owner will not construct 
a park that would also benefit his neighbors unless the neighbors cover some of the costs). 
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surrounding community that, for practical reasons, cannot be 
internalized. But courts have shown themselves unwilling to provide 
such venues with recourse against even those near neighbors who 
purposefully capture spillovers for commercial gain. In an 1886 case, 
for example, the Michigan Supreme Court rejected the Detroit Base-
Ball Club’s claim for injunctive relief against a neighbor who erected 
viewing stands that allowed his customers to observe games without 
paying admission.114 A similar scenario was presented in an Australian 
case, Victoria Park Racing & Recreation Grounds Co. v. Taylor.115 
There, the High Court rejected the idea of “property in a spectacle” 
and declined to enjoin radio broadcasts carried out from premises 
overlooking an open-air horse racing facility.116 
The law is understandably reluctant to allow an enterprise that 
has failed to contain its own spillovers to restrict what nearby 
landowners can do with those spillovers. Line-drawing and 
measurement problems abound. Urban areas contain elaborate webs 
of interdependencies that confound causal inferences about who 
benefited (or harmed) whom.117 Rarely will there be just one 
“anchor tenant” who provides vast nonreciprocal benefits in roughly 
equal measure to all surrounding owners. Instead, there will likely be 
a series of unique uses that not only emit different levels of positive 
and negative externalities but are also enjoyed by nearby landowners 
at varying levels and are reciprocated in varying and greatly unequal 
degrees by those surrounding owners. A more intricate system of 
payments for positive and negative externalities could be imagined, 
although finding a workable way to administer it would be highly 
challenging.118 At some point, however, the opportunity costs of 
 
 114. Detroit Base-Ball Club v. Deppert, 27 N.W. 856, 858 (Mich. 1886); see also 
ELLICKSON ET AL., supra note 74, at 572–73 (noting the general inability of landowners to 
recover for positive externalities they create). 
 115. (1937) 58 CLR 479 (Austl.); see Kevin Gray, Property in Thin Air, 50 CAMBRIDGE 
L.J. 252, passim (1991) (examining connections between property theory and the analysis in 
Victoria Park Racing). 
 116. See Victoria Park Racing, 58 CLR at 492–97 (Latham, C.J.); see also Gray, supra 
note 115, at 268. 
  117.  In Detroit Base-Ball Club, for example, the defendant contended that the 
neighboring ball field had also interfered with the quiet use of his land. 27 N.W. at 857. 
 118. See T. Nicolaus Tideman, Integrating Land-Value Taxation with the Internalization 
of Spatial Externalities, 66 LAND ECON. 341, 341 (1990) (“An ideal system would not only 
match the external benefit or cost [of a landowner’s activities] with a subsidy or tax, but would 
also collect money to finance the subsidies, and distribute the proceeds of the taxes collected, 
according to the impacts of the externalities.”). 
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foregone agglomerations may be large enough to justify the 
considerable costs of attempting to pin down and compensate for 
certain asymmetric impacts.119 
3. Differential pricing 
Another way local governments could address agglomeration 
costs and benefits would be by applying differential pricing to land 
uses and land users. Differential pricing is a common mechanism 
where participant assembly is important. Consider, for example, its 
use in higher education to bring together a desired mix of students—
some students are charged full freight while others receive various 
amounts in scholarships, stipends, and other assistance that allows 
them to attend at reduced or even negative prices.120 
Land use authorities already have access to what amounts to 
differential pricing to the extent that they are free to strike 
individualized bargains with landowners about land uses.121 Their 
ability to do so is arguably impeded, however, by the doctrinal limits 
on bargaining laid out in Nollan and Dolan, and recently (and quite 
confusingly) reinforced and extended in Koontz.122 The selective 
 
 119. See Demsetz, supra note 56. 
  120. See, e.g., Rothschild & White, supra note 14. 
 121. These deals generally fall under the rubric of land use exactions or impact fees. See, 
e.g., Vicki Been, “Exit” as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the Unconstitutional 
Conditions Doctrine, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 473, 478–83 (1991). Such devices might be viewed 
as charging for the negative impacts that the use will inflict on the surrounding community or 
as collecting for the positive benefits that existing infrastructure will provide. See id. at 482–83. 
 122. Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987), required an 
“essential nexus” between the exaction and the rationale for the land use restriction that was 
lifted in exchange for it. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994), added the requirement 
of “rough proportionality” between the impacts that the land use restriction would control and 
the exaction. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management District, 133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013), 
held that these limits apply to monetary exactions as well as physical ones, and that the 
prohibition extends to bargaining efforts that do not actually result in any money or land 
changing hands. It is unclear to what extent these limits have actually blocked desired deals, as 
opposed to simply channeling them (at some positive cost) to repeat players or through 
particular procedural hoops. See, e.g., David A. Dana, Land Use Regulation in an Age of 
Heightened Scrutiny, 75 N.C. L. REV. 1243, 1286–99 (1997) (positing that exactions 
restrictions will benefit repeat players who can be trusted not to sue); FISCHEL, supra note 65, 
at 67 (suggesting developers will choose to pay—or “donate”—rather than litigate). The 
expanded domain of heightened scrutiny ushered in by Koontz may also matter less in practice 
than anticipated, depending on the remedies that are applied (an issue the Supreme Court did 
not decide). See Rick Hills, Koontz’s Unintelligible Takings Rule: Can Remedial Equivocation 
Save the Court from a Doctrinal Quagmire? PRAWFSBLAWG (June 25, 2013, 3:41 PM), 
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2013/06/koontzs-unintelligible-takings-rule-
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determination of development “prices” based on each landowner’s 
contributions to agglomeration benefits may be especially hard to 
square with doctrine.123 Perhaps the growing significance of 
agglomeration economies to economic value will eventually create 
pressure to relax the doctrine, however, permitting more value-
enhancing trades.124 Other ways of effectively altering prices include 
using eminent domain to allow certain projects to go forward and 
offering tax breaks to particular parties.125 
Sometimes differential pricing occurs not explicitly by setting a 
variety of monetary prices for different participants, but implicitly 
by setting in-kind conditions that are cheaper or more expensive for 
certain categories of participants to fulfill. Consider in this 
connection the requirements under the Homestead Act, which 
made living on and working the land for a period of time a 
condition of perfecting title.126 Similarly, concert ticket pricing 
typically combines a below-market-clearing price with an in-kind 
charge—standing in a queue. If those who are willing to stand in a 
queue are, on average, better audience members than those who 
are simply willing to pay a higher price, the two-part pricing will 
work better at participant assembly than a market-clearing price.127 
 
can-remedial-equivocation-make-up-for-an-incoherent-substantive-.html. 
 123. Koontz left open precisely how the monetary exactions subject to heightened 
scrutiny under Nollan and Dolan would be distinguished from ordinary taxes and fees. One 
possibility would be to apply heightened scrutiny only to adjudicative types of exactions 
imposed on a case-by-case basis, and not to legislatively imposed exactions. See Koontz, 133 S. 
Ct. at 2608 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (noting this possible distinction, which some state courts 
have embraced). Even if this refinement were adopted, however, it would not help to facilitate 
the kind of price discrimination contemplated in the text, unless good proxies for contributions 
to agglomeration could be built into a legislatively enacted schedule of fees. For related 
discussions see, for example, Hills & Schleicher, supra note 67 at 53–59; Levine-Schnur, supra 
note 60, at 160–62 (discussing factors that might be evaluated in an “urban impact 
assessment” to determine contributions and suggesting ways in which discretion might 
be calibrated). 
 124. On the other hand, there may be substantial uncertainty about the degree to which 
differential pricing carried out by a local governmental entity would produce the social 
optimum, given potential information and incentive problems. 
 125. See, e.g., David A. Dana, Reframing Eminent Domain: Unsupported Advocacy, 
Ambiguous Economics, and the Case for a New Public Use Test, 32 VT. L. REV. 129 (2007) 
(explaining how eminent domain lowers land assembly costs for developers, and noting other 
methods, such as subsidies, for similarly reducing the cost of development). 
 126. See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Inalienability and the Theory of Property Rights, 85 
COLUM. L. REV. 931, 960–61 (1985) (discussing self-selection in the context of the 
Homestead Acts). 
 127. See, e.g., Lutz-Alexander Busch & Philip A. Curry, Ticket Pricing and the Impression 
DO NOT DE LETE  9/25/2015 1:47 PM 
1373 Agglomerama 
 1409 
Similar approaches might be attempted in urban contexts. For 
example, certain neighborhoods by virtue of their “edginess” may 
screen out some populations while attracting others. Although this 
often happens in an unplanned manner, governments can 
intentionally embed uses and amenities that will produce self-
selection effects or allow developers to do so.128 To take a small-scale 
example, simply removing parking facilities from a beach area will 
have an impact on the number and type of beachgoers, and the 
activities that they undertake.129 Requiring that beachgoers make it 
 
of Excess Demand, 111 ECON. LETTERS 40 (2011) (presenting a two-part pricing model for 
event tickets in which fans of higher quality have a lower cost of lining up, allowing the line-up 
to perform a quality-screening function); Allan C. DeSerpa, To Err Is Rational: A Theory of 
Excess Demand for Tickets, 15 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 511, 515–17 (1994) 
(presenting a concert pricing model in which “the highest-demand buyers in terms of money 
price will generally not be the ‘best audience’ in their own estimation”). 
 128. See GARY S. BECKER & KEVIN M. MURPHY, SOCIAL ECONOMICS: MARKET 
BEHAVIOR IN A SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT 72 (2000) (noting the possibility that governments 
use amenity choice to shape demographics); Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Exclusionary Amenities in 
Residential Communities, 92 VA. L. REV. 437 (2006) (discussing the use of “exclusionary 
amenities” in private residential communities). Some of the strategies Richard Florida 
proposed for attracting and retaining the “creative class” would fall in this category as well. See 
generally RICHARD FLORIDA, THE RISE OF THE CREATIVE CLASS (2002). Florida’s thesis has 
been the subject of significant criticism. See, e.g., Michele Hoyman & Christopher Faricy, It 
Takes a Village: A Test of the Creative Class, Social Capital, and Human Capital Theories, 44 
URB. AFF. REV. 311, 329 (2009) (finding no relationship between the presence of a creative 
class and “job growth, growth in wages, or absolute levels of wages” and finding a negative 
correlation between measures of the creative class and other economic measures); Jamie Peck, 
Struggling with the Creative Class, 29 INT’L J. URB. & REGIONAL RESEARCH 740 (2005) 
(discussing and critiquing Florida’s thesis). As these critiques suggest, the ability of 
communities to successfully pursue agglomeration benefits through strategies aimed at 
selection effects would depend on their having good empirical information about the impacts 
of those strategies. 
 129. Scarce parking would weed out visitors who prefer to drive and might reduce the 
spontaneous formation of crowds. Likewise, increasing the proportion of people who arrive by 
bicycle or mass transit and who therefore cannot conveniently carry tents, grills, and other 
bulky items, may change the activities and average length of time spent at the beach. These 
issues have come to the forefront in a recent debate over reducing parking at a popular 
Chicago beach, a move considered following a large illegal concert held there. See John 
Keilman, Architect’s Montrose Beach Plan Would Sacrifice Parking, CHI. TRIB., July 23, 2014, 
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/chi-montrose-beach-improvement-
plan-20140723-story.html. The intentional manipulation of amenities to exclude populations 
from public beaches has at times taken reprehensible forms. See ROBERT A. CARO, THE POWER 
BROKER: ROBERT MOSES AND THE FALL OF NEW YORK 318–19 (1974) (describing Robert 
Moses’s efforts to exclude low-income and African-American families from Jones Beach by, 
among other things, limiting public transportation to the beach and charging high parking 
fees); see also LIOR JACOB STRAHILEVITZ, INFORMATION AND EXCLUSION 193–95 (2011) 
(discussing Moses’s exclusionary tactics). 
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to the beach by walking or biking imposes an in-kind tax that 
automatically filters the population; it might produce a beach full of 
people who are more fit, on average, than if the beach is made 
accessible by private automobile. But such requirements might also 
produce an underutilized beach under some plausible assumptions. 
If the goal is not just to prevent overcrowding but to produce 
optimal usage of an area and to make it a locus of interesting 
interactions, then too few users (of the right sort) is as bad as too 
many.130 Whatever filters are put in place to control access must not 
be so stringent as to stymie production of the shared experience, nor 
so loose as to degrade its quality. It is also essential to ensure that 
such approaches do not become back-door mechanisms for 
discrimination along forbidden dimensions.131 Giving close attention 
to in-kind pricing can both open up new possibilities and reveal the 
ways in which such strategies are already (perhaps unwittingly) being 
employed. Awareness of these approaches is especially important 
given normative concerns about certain incarnations of them. 
4. Revising zoning 
Traditional Euclidian zoning, the type in use in nearly all 
communities above a certain size, operates by specifying uses that are 
permitted in particular zones and banning all others.132 This 
approach does not deal well with the challenges of agglomeration. 
But other forms of zoning might carry more promise in this regard. 
Performance zoning focuses not on uses but rather on their impacts, 
such as certain decibel readings or pollutant concentrations detected 
 
 130. See, e.g., MICHAEL HELLER, THE GRIDLOCK ECONOMY 32–37 (2008) (discussing 
the problem of underuse in connection with the anticommons); Rose, supra note 5 at 769 
(noting the need to encourage certain forms of participation). 
 131. See, e.g., BECKER & MURPHY, supra note 128, at 72; STRAHILEVITZ, supra note 
129; Strahilevitz, supra note 128. 
 132. The zoning scheme upheld in City of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 
(1926), was cumulative in nature: each successive zoning category allowed increasingly 
intensive uses, but continued to permit the less intensive uses that were allowed in the more 
exclusive zoning categories. Modern zoning is often noncumulative, generating mutually 
exclusive realms for different uses. See, e.g., DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 979 (8th ed. 
2014) (distinguishing cumulative from noncumulative zoning). The choice between 
cumulative and noncumulative zoning could carry significant implications for agglomeration 
economies. See Roderick M. Hills, Jr. & David N. Schleicher, The Steep Costs of Using 
Noncumulative Zoning to Preserve Land for Urban Manufacturing, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 249, 
262–67 (2010). 
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outside the owned parcel.133 While usually considered in the context 
of negative externalities like noise or emissions, performance zoning 
would be interesting to consider in the context of 
positive externalities. 
Suppose, for example, that cameras or other technologies could 
determine the number of trips on foot to a given store from outside 
of a fixed radius of, say, a couple blocks. In a “high foot traffic” 
zone, new uses might be permitted only if they can guarantee (say, 
by posting a bond) that they will draw a certain amount of foot 
traffic into the area on average, over a particular span of time. In 
areas where only a few stores are likely to serve as “magnets” that 
draw in foot traffic, designating entire zones might not be desirable; 
instead, special exceptions for larger or denser uses might be granted 
to those willing and able to meet this output target. 
As another example, suppose that knowledge spillovers comprise 
the primary desired agglomeration benefits. Here, zoning might 
specify that uses in the area have a certain minimum average number 
of employees on site each workday, thereby discouraging companies 
from adopting liberal work-from-home policies. More intrusively, 
targets could even be set for such matters as employees consuming 
meals in the immediate area, perhaps through a subsidy program.134 
Such performance standards would be easier to meet for firms whose 
business model involves on-site employees. Although it would not 
necessarily attract the companies that would contain the highest 
quality community contributors, such an approach would at least 
ensure that some of the ingredients for interaction—workers—
are present. 
Similarly, some communities have attempted to use covenants or 
 
 133. See, e.g., JANE JACOBS, DARK AGE AHEAD, 153–57 (2004) (discussing a 
“performance code” focused on impacts); DOUGLAS R. PORTER ET AL., FLEXIBLE ZONING: 
HOW IT WORKS 11 (1988) (explaining how performance zoning in pure form specifies 
permissible effects rather than uses); Frederick W. Acker, Note, Performance Zoning, 67 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 363 (1991) (discussing rationales for and types of performance zoning). 
Performance zoning has not been widely used to date, which can likely be attributed to 
monitoring difficulties. It is possible that technological advances could be harnessed to make 
the use of performance zoning more viable. See, e.g., Lee Anne Fennell, Crowdsourcing Land 
Use, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 385, 391–96 (2013). 
 134. Subsidized meals are a very common way to encourage interaction. See, e.g., 
Prospective Students, Academic Culture, U. CHI. L. SCH., http://www.law.uchicago
.edu/prospective/academicculture (last visited Oct. 15, 2014) (“Learning through lunch is a 
tradition at Chicago.”). 
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zoning to restrict residential occupancy to those who will be present 
on a relatively long-term basis.135 Presumably, such restrictions are 
motivated by views about the positive and negative spillovers 
produced by properties that are mostly left vacant or that experience 
high turnover as compared with those that are continuously 
occupied by the same parties. 
Drawing on the discussion above, zoning might also seek to 
more directly address energy/clog ratios, perhaps through scoring 
systems that examine factors like traffic impacts, foot traffic, the 
commuting and parking patterns of the workers, and so on, in 
conjunction with the space requirements of the use. Particular uses 
that are thought to be especially important to the city’s life can also 
be directly encouraged, as some communities have done in setting 
aside housing for artists.136 Transect zoning represents a somewhat 
similar idea: it focuses on the types of buildings that will appear in 
different areas of a city, letting land use follow form rather than the 
other way around.137 But building forms are at best a rough proxy 
for the kinds of considerations that are most important to 
agglomeration economies and diseconomies; a better approach 
would be to focus directly on the considerations themselves—if local 
governments can determine what they are. 
5. Rethinking everlasting, rooted estates 
A final set of ideas, which I am developing further in separate 
work, strikes at the heart of existing property forms. The 
assumption that property rights must be granted in physically 
rooted locations and be perpetual in length should be rethought in 
 
 135. See, e.g., Natalie Sherman, Weekly Rentals in Ocean City May Be Outlawed, BALT. 
SUN, Aug. 16, 2014, available at http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2014-08-
16/business/bs-bz-ocean-city-rentals-20140816_1_short-term-rentals-weekly-rentals-
planning-and-zoning-commission; TOWN OF NANTUCKET, MASS. ZONING CODE § 139-
2(A)(5) (2009), http://ecode360.com/11471475 (requiring that occupancy of accessory 
apartments “be limited to natural persons domiciled in the Town of Nantucket year round 
and that the dwelling may not be offered for nor used for seasonal occupancy”). 
 136. See, e.g., ArtistSpace Housing, BOSTON REDEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, 
http://www.bostonredevelopmentauthority.org/housing/artist-housing/artistspace-housing-
overview (last visited Oct. 15, 2014). 
 137. See Nicole Stelle Garnett, Redeeming Transect Zoning, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 571, 
575–76 (2013) (explaining that “transect zoning permits a wide variety of land uses 
throughout a community, so long as these uses are carried out in buildings that are appropriate 
in size and design to the zone where they are located”) (footnote omitted). 
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light of the sea change that has transpired over recent centuries in 
how property generates value. Building optional forms of 
impermanence and portability into tenure forms could offer 
important new avenues for restructuring property rights. 
Consider first the possibility of a less permanent estate that would 
(unlike a leasehold) embody the other features of full ownership, but 
that would be expressly “callable” by the government after a certain 
period of time.138 Already, governments hold call options insofar as 
eminent domain can truncate rights of private landowners. Creating 
estates that are impermanent by design and enabling local 
governments to designate areas in which these callable estates will be 
located would provide a great deal more flexibility. It would also 
enable parties to sort into more or less permanent property rights 
arrangements, depending on their preferences. By making 
redevelopment easier in certain areas, such an approach would be 
expected to reduce resort to eminent domain in other areas. 
A second idea would loosen the usual assumption that real 
property interests must be tied to a particular physical location. 
Suppose, for example, that parties in urban areas could purchase 
“floating estates” of a particular value, with particular attributes, on 
the understanding that their property interest might be physically 
moved to a different location within a defined zone at some later 
time,with relocation costs covered. 
As unusual as this may sound, there are antecedents. Land 
readjustment, although not well-known in the United States, has 
been used in other countries to accomplish something very similar to 
this idea.139 Instead of simply condemning private property through 
 
 138. Such a property interest could take the form of a fee simple subject to executory 
limitation. See, e.g., DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 290–92 (8th ed. 2014) (defining and 
describing these estates). The trigger conditions for the executory interest might be tied to 
certain economic or social indicators that suggest the appropriateness of redevelopment, to the 
passage of a certain amount of time, or both. Such an approach could work entirely within 
existing tenure forms, consistent with the numerus clausus principle. See, e.g., Thomas W. 
Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus 
Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 26 (2000). 
 139. See, e.g., Yu-Hung Hong, Assembling Land for Urban Development: Issues and 
Opportunities, in ANALYZING LAND READJUSTMENT: ECONOMICS, LAW, AND COLLECTIVE 
ACTION 3, 23–24 (Yu-Hung Hong & Barrie Needham eds., 2007) (describing reallocation 
methods). Although approaches vary considerably, the basic idea can be illustrated by 
imagining a low-density residential neighborhood that would be more valuable if it were 
replaced with a higher-density mixed-use development. The area might be razed and 
redeveloped with higher-density residences, shops, and green space. Each former resident 
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eminent domain, land readjustment displaces parties from their 
original locations but grants them equally valuable land parcels in the 
redeveloped area or shares in the enterprises that their displacement 
made possible. Acceptance for this approach might be higher if, 
instead of simply placing all landowners at risk of such a land swap, 
parties could choose to purchase land that would be subject to such 
an arrangement in the future. Again, the goal would be to increase 
both security and flexibility by enabling people to opt into 
arrangements that diverge from the traditional rooted, perpetual 
fee simple. 
CONCLUSION 
Agglomeration economies are already central to how property 
generates value and will become even more important going 
forward. Urbanization has fundamentally changed the way in which 
property is used, and has dramatically increased the degree of 
interdependence among land users and land uses. It is important that 
commons scholars begin unpacking the nature of the dilemmas that 
this global trend has created and start finding ways to adapt existing 
property tools—or invent new ones—to address these new 
challenges. I hope this essay offers a step in that direction. 
 
 
might then receive a smaller residential site in the new development, but because of the effects 
of the new development, it would be of equal or greater value than the property she was 
initially required to give up. For more background on this approach and its many variations, 
see generally ANALYZING LAND READJUSTMENT, supra; George W. Liebmann, Land 
Readjustment for America: A Proposal for a Statute, 32 URB. LAW. 1 (2000). 
